Traditional attack detection schemes based on packets or flows have very high computational complexity. And, network based anomaly detection schemes can reduce the complexity, but they have a limitation to figure out the pattern of the distributed global scale network attack. In this paper, we propose an efficient and fast method for detecting distributed global-scale network attack symptoms in high-speed backbone networks. The proposed method is implemented at the aggregate traffic level. So, our proposed scheme has much lower computational complexity, and is implemented in very high-speed backbone networks. In addition, the proposed method can detect attack patterns, such as attacks in which the target is a certain host or the backbone infrastructure itself, via collaboration of edge routers on the backbone network. The effectiveness of the proposed method are demonstrated via simulation.
Introduction
There have been several threats on the Internet infrastructure by malicious network attacks such as [1] and [2] . Attacks on the Internet infrastructure can cause enormous damage, since different infrastructure components of the Internet have implicit trust relationships [3] .
Traditional security solutions against network attacks have been focused on individual packets or flows [3] [4] [5] [6] . However, they require very high computational complexity, and cannot be directly applied to high-speed backbone network environments. In order to solve the computational complexity problems, network based anomaly detection schemes have been also proposed [7] [11] [12] [13] . In those schemes, significant deviations from normal behavior of aggregate traffic pattern at a high-speed link are used as key criteria to detect attack symptoms. Those methodologies focused on detecting network attacks on individual links for securing end-networks connected to those links. However, in order to react against distributed global-scale network attacks, the attack pattern as well as symptom should be detected at the same time. It is noted that distributed global-scale network attacks can be more precisely visible in the backbone domain rather than at any individual link.
In this paper, we propose an efficient method for detecting distributed global-scale network attack symptoms and patterns on a high-speed Internet backbone network. The proposed attack detection method is extended from our previous work of [7] , in which attack detection is carried out at an incoming link of an edge router. Since the detection of attack symptoms is performed at the aggregate traffic level, this can result in much lower computational complexity than existing schemes. In addition, it can also detect attack patterns, such as attacks in which the target is a certain host or the backbone network infrastructure itself, via collaboration of edge routers on the backbone network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the proposed method for detecting network attack symptoms and patterns at the aggregate traffic level is explained. Experimental results are given in Section 3. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 4. Fig. 1 shows the network model considered in this paper. N edge routers, E 0 , E 1 , ..., E N-1 , are connected to a backbone network, and send traffic information associated with detection of attack symptoms and patterns to a global detection system (GDS). A detailed description on the mechanism of edge routers and GDS will be explained in the next sections.
Detection of Attack Symptoms and Patterns

Network Model
Detection of Attack Symptoms on an Outgoing Link
To reduce the computational complexity of attack detection, the method operated at the aggregate traffic level has been proposed [7] . However, since the method of [7] detects the attack symptom at an incoming link of an edge router connected to a backbone network, it has the limitation to figure out the pattern of the detected attack. In order to react against network attacks, the attack pattern as well as symptom should be detected at the same time.
To solve the problem, we extend the method of [7] to be fitted for the network model of 
Fig. 1. Network model
In [7] , two measures for the attack detection have been derived from the extensive investigation of actually captured data at an Internet backbone network. IP spoofing and scanning attack types have been considered in the investigation. The two measures are the packet count-to-the traffic volume ratio (CVR) and the average power spectrum (APS). The former reflects the dynamics of traffic volumes from the view points of burstiness, while the latter does the self-similar nature of network traffic.
Let us assume that time is partitioned into discrete periods, Δ, then Δ is a basic unit of traffic measurement. Let ij n c and ij n v (i,j=0,1,2,…,N-1, and n=0,1,2,…) be the packet count and traffic volume of aggregate traffic from E i to E j measured during the n-th Δ period, respectively. Let LΔ be the detection period, which is the time period that the detection algorithm is applied to. Each detection period consists of L independent consecutive Δs. And, we define packet counts and traffic volumes measured during the m-th detection period as vectors . Note that the APS is a metric associated with the effect of selfsimilarity due to network attacks. Xiang et al [11] also used the self-similarity to detect attack symptoms by calculating the Hurst parameter directly. However, the only self-similar nature is considered for their detection process, but it is insufficient to reflect the packet count dynamics. So, we use the second parameter, CVS, to reflect the packet dynamics.
CVR is given by; be weighted averages of the APS and the CVR measured during the m-th detection period, respectively, and given by; (3) and (4). Then, the state is determined by the following sequence; • Concentrated Attack : An attack concentrated on a target host or network In an attack concentrated on a target host or network, shortly concentrated attack, a large number of packets from many infected hosts are sent to the target host or network to disable it. An example traffic flow for this kind of attack pattern is shown in Fig. 3(a) , in which a target host is connected to a network via an edge router i E . After vulnerable hosts in other networks are infected, all attack packets generated from these infected hosts are concentrated on router E i via all other edge routers connected to these infected hosts. Accordingly, among all elements of attack counter matrix …,N-1, j≠i) , in the shaded region in Fig. 3(b) , are increased. Then, after attack symptoms on attack links are detected using the algorithm shown in Table 1 , the attack state matrix S(m) takes the form shown in Fig. 3(c) , such that only elements In an attack in which attack packets are dispersed over the entire network, as shown in Fig.  4(a) , shortly dispersed attack, a certain malicious host connected to an edge router disperses a large number of packets over the entire network via other edge routers, in order to disrupt and disable the backbone network itself, or find and infect vulnerable hosts in the entire network. In this case, since a large number of attack packets are sent from an edge router, for example, i E , to all other edge routers, only
, in the shaded region in Fig. 4(b) , are increased. Then, as a result of attack symptom detection, attack states ) (m s ij (j=0,…,N-1), in the shaded region in Fig. 4(c) , are ATTACK, while others are NORMAL. 
Experimental Results
Experimental Setup
An ns-2 simulator [9] with the network configuration shown in Fig. 5 was used for the experiments. The backbone network consisted of five edge routers;E 0 , E 1 , …, E 4 with a fullmeshed connection between them. Each edge router was connected to an AS router, which is an intermediate router between the backbone and other networks. Nodes N, AC and AD generated traffic which was normal, concentrated and dispersed, respectively. Node S received all traffic from other routers or networks.
Once a vulnerable host is infected, it generates attack packets according to the infected attack pattern. As the number of infected hosts in a network increases, we can assume that aggregate attack traffic sent to the backbone network also increases, in proportion to the number of infected hosts. Based on this assumption, we constructed the following aggregate attack traffic generation model, such that the number of infected hosts over time was approximately in accordance with the worm propagation model proposed by Weaver [10] . Unlike Weaver's original model, for the convenience of the simulation, we partitioned time into segments of discrete periods, as shown in Fig. 6 , in which the vertical axis represents the ratio of the aggregate attack traffic volume to the link capacity as a percentage. For the generation of aggregate attack traffic, we used the self-similar traffic generation model given in [8] ; the Hurst parameter was 0.99, and the average number of packets in each partitioned time segment is shown in Fig. 6 . 
Case I: Dispersed Attack
Traffic Generation: In a dispersed attack, a large number of attack packets are sent from an edge router with many infected hosts, to all other edge routers. In order to represent this case, we assumed that at the start of the simulation there was no infection, but after 10 seconds, an attack packet was generated only by node AD 0 in AS0, according to the worm propagation model shown in Fig. 6 . And, the packets generated by AD 0 were evenly distributed to all other edge routers E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 via E 0 . Fig. 7 shows traffic characteristics generated by AD 0 . In addition, as background traffic, normal traffic was generated by all nodes i N (i=0,1,2,3,4) with the Hurst parameter of 0.9. And, the following values are used for the experiment: p α = r α =0.9, Alert_Threshold=5, Attack_Threshold = 10.
total from E0 to E1, E2, E3, and E4, respectively , as shown in Fig. 9 . In the simulation scenario, all attack packets were distributed from edge router 0 E to all other edge routers on the backbone network. Accordingly, as time advanced, only these states of j s 0 (j=1,2,3,4) were changed to ATTACK via ALERT, while other states remained NORMAL. Finally, as shown in Fig. 9(d) , from ) (m S , GDS could easily detect symptoms and corresponding patterns of the dispersed attack.
Case II: Concentrated Attack
Traffic Generation: In a concentrated attack, a large number of packets from many infected hosts are concentrated on a target host, to disable it. In order to show that the proposed method can detect the pattern of such an attack, we generated attack packets as follows. It was assumed that the target host is connected to E 2 via AS 2 , and nodes AC 0 , AC 1 , AC 3 generate attack packets sent to the target host. In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed method, it was also assumed that no attack packets were generated by AS 4, because AS 4 was perfectly secure. The characteristics of attack traffic generated by AC nodes are as same as those by AD 0 , as described in Section 3.2 and shown in Fig. 7 . Unlike AD0 described in Section 3.2, however, all packets generated by AC nodes are sent only to edge router 2 E . For convenience, to show worm propagation via the entire backbone network, the start times of worm propagation in AS0, AS1, AS2 and AS3 are set to 10, 30, 50, and 70 seconds, respectively, as shown in Fig. 10 . There was no infected host until 10 seconds after the simulation had begun. We call each time interval between the start times of consecutive worm propagation a period, as shown in Fig. 10 . As mentioned previously, the worm propagation model in each AS is in accordance with the model shown in Fig. 6 . Note that since AS4 was secure, no infection appeared in AS4. Experimental Results: The attack state matrix during Period-1 was the same as that shown in Fig. 8 , since there was no attack packet in that period. In Period-2, attack packets were generated by AS 0 only, and sent to 2 E via 0 E . Accordingly, s were gradually changed to ATTACK, as shown in Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 , respectively. All attack packets generated by AC 2 were internally distributed to the target host in AS 2 , and 2 , 2 s was not changed. In addition, since AS4 was secure, no attack packets were generated by E4, accordingly 2 , 4 s remained NORMAL. Fig. 13(b) shows the final attack state for our attack simulation scenario, and it is clear that a host or network connected to 2 E was attacked by 0 E , 1 E , and 3 E , which constitutes a concentrated attack. 
Case III: Hybrid of Dispersed and Concentrated Attacks
Traffic Generation: In this case, both dispersed and concentrated attack packets were generated simultaneously. Dispersed attack packets from each node AC were generated in the same manner as in Section 3.2. Unlike Section 3.2, however, nodes AC 1 , AC 2 , and AC 3 as well as AC0 generated dispersed attack packets, and these packets were evenly distributed to other edge routers. In addition, worm propagation for dispersed attacks from AS 0 , AS 1 , AS 2 and AS 3 started at different times according to the time frame, as shown in Fig. 10 . On the other hand, concentrated attacks were performed in the same manner as in Section 3.3. And, it was also assumed that AS4 was secure, thus, no attack packet was generated from 4 E .
(a) 70 sec (b) 75 sec Fig. 15, Fig. 16, and Fig. 17 , it is clear that attacks are dispersed over the entire network according to the given time frame shown in Fig. 10 . 
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an efficient and fast method for detecting patterns as well as symptoms of a distributed global-scale-network attack. We showed the effectiveness of the proposed method in experiments. As mentioned previously, conventional schemes are based on individual packet or flow levels, thus, they have very high computational complexity, and cannot be directly applied to detection of global-scale network attacks on high-speed Internet backbone networks. On the other hand, since the proposed method can detect attack symptoms at the aggregate traffic level, it can be implemented on high speed backbone links. In addition, GDS gathers the attack information from all edge routers, the exact pattern of global-scale network attack can be detected. With the detected attack pattern, the reaction against the attack can be easily done, which requires further study. Though the network model with 5 routers are used to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, even within backbone network with a large set of routers and a huge amount of background traffic, the proposed scheme can work well because the detection process is applied to each pair between ingress and egress nodes at aggregate traffic level. As we mentioned, when attack traffic is added, the aggregate traffic pattern will be dramatically changed compared to the normal traffic environment, in which only background-like traffic are appeared.
In addition, since each backbone network has its own particular network management systems for monitoring and maintaining itself, we postulate that it is easy to construct a global defense infrastructure against network attacks, with the capability of our proposed method to detect patterns of distributed global-scale network attacks. Details on the construction of the global defense infrastructure require further study.
